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141.
以气氧/煤油作为推进剂对火箭发动机进行流量连续调节试验,研究火箭发动机连续变工况过程中的燃烧特性。火箭发动机通过可调气蚀文氏管连续调节煤油流量。试验在富燃工况(混合比0.405~0.690)下成功点火,并实现了混合比、燃气总流量连续调节。试验发现流量连续调节过程中,当混合比小于0.535时,燃烧室压力随煤油流量减小而增大;当混合比大于0.535时,燃烧室压力随煤油流量减小而减小。同时,特征速度和燃烧效率随混合比增大而增大,并且混合比小于0.535时特征速度、燃烧效率增大的速率大于混合比大于0.535时的速率。研究表明推进剂流量与燃烧效率同时影响燃烧室压力。当混合比小于0.535时,燃烧效率的影响占优;混合比大于0.535时,推进剂流量影响占优。 相似文献
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在分析了现有任务剖面存在不足的基础上,提出了基于任务成功性的常规潜艇任务剖面构建技术,即对具有不同特点的任务阶段采用不同的构建技术.静态的任务阶段采用任务树图、时间基准图和任务剖面信息表进行描述;作战阶段具有随机性和不确定性,则采用流程建模工具IDEF3建立作战阶段的任务剖面模型,用来描述作战阶段的元任务及其逻辑关系、时序关系.基于任务成功性的任务剖面将为保障性工程的开展奠定基础. 相似文献
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Riley M. Moore 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(5):857-878
As a consequence of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, force ratio for counterinsurgency (COIN) has come under increased scrutiny. Reduced to its essence, the issue is simply, ‘How many troops does it take to get the job done?’ This answer has been sought by the US military, academia, and think tanks. There have been numerous responses, culminating in several ‘plug-and-play’ equations for minimum force ratios in COIN operations. Due to the impossibility of determining precisely how many insurgent forces there are, it has become common to base force ratios on the population of the country. In the realm of policy, the question above is posed as, ‘How many of our troops does it take to get the job done?’ 相似文献
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Vadim Kolnogorov 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(2):339-359
Few issues were as contentious in the development of the Soviet Navy as the role of aircraft carriers and sea-based aviation. Despite the continued insistence by the highest naval authorities and scientific experts that surface combatants simply could not be protected in the open ocean without the support of ship-borne aviation, Soviet leaders – for a variety of reasons – resisted aircraft carrier development until the final decades of the Cold War. In examining one of the most defining and telling asymmetries of the Cold War at sea, the author argues that while the USSR was economically and technologically capable of building aircraft carriers of any class, bureaucratic infighting, misperceptions of cost and practicality, and the inherent flaws of a totalitarian system ultimately created an impossible gap in capabilities between the two sides. The priorities and direction of Soviet weapons and defense technology development during the Cold War was largely a factor of the military-political situation taking shape at home, and in the world. As a rule, the navy was assigned missions that corresponded to its capabilities at a given point in time, rather than the other way around. Often, the navy lacked the material resources needed to implement its core mission. The availability of these resources, in turn, depended on the country's economic situation, its scientific potential, the technological state of its industry, as well as the subjective influence of political and military leaders on the priorities of technological development. The impact of the country's socioeconomic imperatives was undoubtedly also felt in the sluggish pace of development of ship-borne aviation and aircraft carriers in the USSR. 相似文献
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This paper provides a contribution to the growing corpus of knowledge and understanding of the interaction between economic growth and defence spending in South Africa by specifying a Keynesian simultaneous equation model and estimating the system for the period 1961 to 1997. The model contains a growth equation, a savings equation, a trade balance equation and a military burden equation and when estimated by single equation and systems estimation methods is relatively well specified. There is evidence of an overall negative effect of military spending on the economy over this period, though the significance of individual coefficients is low. There is certainly no evidence of any positive impact, suggesting that cuts in military spending do present an opportunity for improved macroeconomic performance. 相似文献
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